Social Status and Change: The Question of Access to Resources and Women\u27s Empowerment in the Middle East and North Africa by Haghighat, Elhum
Journal of International Women's Studies
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 17
Jan-2013
Social Status and Change: The Question of Access
to Resources and Women's Empowerment in the
Middle East and North Africa
Elhum Haghighat
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Recommended Citation
Haghighat, Elhum (2013). Social Status and Change: The Question of Access to Resources and Women's Empowerment in the Middle
East and North Africa. Journal of International Women's Studies, 14(1), 273-299.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol14/iss1/17
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or sys-
tematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to 
anyone is expressly forbidden. ©2013 Journal of International Women’s Studies. 
273 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 1  January 2013 
 
 
Social Status and Change: 
The Question of Access to Resources and Women’s Empowerment 








Women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) do not face a single social ideolo-
gy that opposes change. It is incorrect to conclude that Islam per se is predominantly responsible 
for limiting women’s access to resources, employment, reproductive health, and social services. 
It is critical, however, to understand how Islam is used as an instrument of control in the hands of 
the governing elite; when expedient, Islam and historical traditions of patriarchy supply a 
framework and a justification for impeding or limiting women’s progress. At times, it has also 
been used in concert with government aims to slow population growth or secure female workers. 
Islam plays a role in regulating women’s social status, however, a multi-dimensional approach 
that assesses demographic changes, economic and political realities, and regional instability of-
fers a broader insight into the issue of women’s status in the MENA region.  
 
Key words: Women’s Social Status, Empowerment, Political & Social Transformations, Demo-
graphic Changes, Modernization Process & Its Effect on Women’s Social Status, Middle East, 
Middle East & North Africa 
 
 
Social status equates to a recognized social position within a society’s hierarchy. It is one 
way individuals define who they are and their relationship to others and gender plays a large part 
in defining an individual’s social status. When it is considered within a socio-cultural context as 
well as structural, gender inequality is influenced by class, religion, race, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, and age.
2
 This paper focuses on gender inequality in the MENA region primarily in 
terms of women’s status, religion, and the intersection of politics and religion on structural 
inequalities. 
Multiple factors contribute to women achieving an elevated social status including access 
to material resources such as land, wealth, jobs, and health care, and non-material resources such 
as knowledge, reproductive control and prestige (e.g. bearing sons in patriarchal societies). 
Under patriarchal family and social systems, men in general control the resources and therefore 
maintain control over the family (and control of social opportunities) (Mason, 1986, 2001). In 
the Middle East and North African (MENA) region, women have been gaining access to 
resources such as education and reproductive health, however, as I will explain in this paper, 
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2
 Risman (2004) and Lorber (1994) argue that gender is a social structure and is embedded in everyday social insti-
tutions. In modern societies, gender is institutionalized to justify social stratification and the subordinate position of 
women to men. Risman (1994:437) illustrates different dimension of gender structure on individual level (e.g. so-
cialization), international level based on cultural expectations (e.g. status expectations), and institutional level (e.g. 
legal processes and regulations, distribution of resources, ideological expectations).  
274 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 1  January 2013 
access to resources is only one requirement for acquiring control and a more equal standing in 
the society. To acquire and exercise influence and control one needs to have choices and the 
authority to make decisions. Access to resources plus choices and the ability to make decisions 
and influence decisions in the familial/kinship realm and the socio-political realm ultimately 
confer power and elevated social status. 
 
 
Status Measured by Empowerment 
Kabeer (2000), in her thought-provoking article on women’s status and empowerment, 
describes empowerment as the purview of people who have been shut out of power but who then 
acquire the ability to exercise choice: 
 
One way of thinking about power is in terms of the ability to make choices: to be 
disempowered, implies to be denied choice . . . the notion of empowerment is that 
it is inescapably bound up with the condition of disempowerment and refers to the 
processes by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices ac-
quire such an ability . . . empowerment entails a process of change. People who 
exercise a great deal of choice in their lives may be very powerful, but they are 
not empowered, because they were never disempowered in the first place. (pp. 
436–437) 
 
According to Kabeer, access to resources is only one of three criteria that enable women to 
advance their social status and power. She identifies three dimensions of choice that define 
empowerment: resources, agency, and achievement.  
 
 Resources (i.e., education, health-related services) are an essential precondition 
for exercising choice and acquiring a greater level of power and social status.  
 Agency is the process that defines individual goals and continues to act upon 
them.  
 Achievement is the desired outcome where individuals receive the rewards for 
their achievements (e.g. better employment due to higher education).  
 
Women’s empowerment cannot simply be defined in terms of being able to perform specific 
activities or benefiting from propitious outcomes. It results from a process whereby women can 
freely analyze, develop, and voice their needs and interests without them being predefined or 
unwillingly imposed by religion, government, or social norms and where their influence and 
control extends beyond women’s familial/kinship circles. Therefore, access to resources is an 
important aspect of women’s access to power and a higher social status, but without the ability to 
choose what to do with those resources and the ability to exercise autonomous control of the new 
skills power is limited. Consider the following two examples.  
In a study of Lebanese women, Lattouf (2004) examines women’s social status in modern 
Lebanon. Despite their improved educational attainment, there is a lack of advancement in their 
social status. Lattouf argues that economic stagnation and regional political problems led the 
government to enforce traditional roles and values on women and institute campaigns to 
legitimize discrimination against women. A similar study by Shavarini (2006) reveals the same 
concerns for contemporary Iranian women’s social status. Despite decades of impressive 
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advancements in their educational attainment at the secondary and college levels, there has been 
no commensurate increase in their social status, or opportunities in the job market (the 
unemployment rate for women is as high as 20%, whereas for men it is about 12%). Both 
Shavarini’s and Lattouf’s observation of why families support their daughter’s higher 
educational attainment, despite the questionable rate of economic return, has to do with family 
status: A family will support their daughter’s higher education as a way to improve her chances 
of finding a husband of similar or higher social status, which, in turn, adds to the family’s 
collective social status. Iranian women’s social status, as is the case in many other societies, is 
often determined by their relationship to a male relative or husband. Shavarini states that many 
of the women she interviewed were aware of societal discriminations in finding jobs even with 
their high level of credentials and qualifications. In an economically deprived country such as 
Iran, with a high inflation rate and a high unemployment rate, men are given priority in the job 
market (an implicit and explicit affirmation of their higher social status and relative worth to 
society). Therefore, many highly qualified women with college degrees are unable to find 
suitable employment (as a result, they are unemployed or under-employed). Shavarini (2006) 
discusses the paradox of women’s higher education in Iranian society: 
 
What good is their higher education, then, if society cannot utilize women’s 
education? What are these women supposed to do with that education that has 
been training them, supposedly, for a job that will never materialize? The answer 
to these questions is the paradox of women’s higher education in Iranian society. 
(p. 207)  
 
Kabeer’s three dimensions of choice, explain why women’s access to higher education 
(resources) is not enough to empower them in Iran and Lebanon. If women are educated but not 
given much access to political and economic power, the process of empowerment is not 
complete; their status remains low despite a greater investment in their human capital.  
In Kabeer’s framework, agency and achievement must follow resources. Iran and 
Lebanon are two examples of countries where the government has been offering resources, but 
tapping into and capitalizing on deep-seated notions of traditional family values to keep women 
out of the labor force and overall political involvements. What could be spurring this strict 
adherence to traditionalism? Is it absolute devotion to Islam? In reality, their stagnant economies 
have led to a desperate shortage of jobs, and high inflation and unemployment rates. Men are 
given priority and the society justifies this process with the rationalization that it is not an 
economic problem, but rather it is preserving traditional and Islamic family values. The 
educational opportunities are welcomed by women and their families, but women are left with 
limited options for gaining social status other than vicariously through the men in their lives 
(husband, father, or brother). Although women may receive familial/kin support to improve their 
social status, outside of their family/kin circle they face limited choices and many obstacles to 
improve their status. 
On a familial/kin level, if women’s status within their families is a function of their 
attachment to male family members, they can gain some control and influence through an 
exchange of resources (Kandiyoti refers to this as “bargaining with patriarchy”). Kabeer offers 
an example from her study of Hindu and Muslim women in India. Hindu women do not inherit 
property (inheritance of property is collective and is often passed to sons), whereas Muslim 
women according to Sharia law are entitled to an inheritance (a woman’s share is equivalent to 
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half of her brother’s share). Kabeer finds, however, that both Hindu and Muslim women are 
equally property-less. Even though Muslim women are given property rights, this does not 
necessarily mean they exercise them, but they might use them as a bargaining chip (see 
explanations of neo-patriarchy and Kandiyoti’s “bargaining with patriarchy” later in this paper). 
Kabeer’s explanation (2000) is as follows: 
 
Although Muslim women do waive their land rights to their brothers (and may be 
under considerable pressure to do so), they thereby strengthen their future claim 
on their brothers, should their marriage break down. While brothers have a duty 
under Islam to look after their sisters, the waiving of land rights by sisters in 
favour of brothers finds a material basis to a moral entitlement. The necessity for 
such an exchange may reflect women’s subordinate status within the community 
but the fact that women’s land rights are in principle recognized by their 
community gives them a resource to bargain with in a situation in which they 
have few other resources. (p. 444) 
 






Conventional Measures of Women’s Status 
The status of women in political and social demographic studies is often measured 
according to how they rate, relative to men, on the following criteria (this not an exhaustive list): 
 
 access to reproductive health services; 
 access to education; 
 female mortality, infant mortality, for example, male versus female life expectancy (ratio 
of male to female); 
 age at first marriage (the higher her age at marriage, higher her autonomy and decision-
making ability); 
 preference (as well as men’s) for sons; 
 political participation (i.e., percentage of women in the parliament); and 
 paid employment (i.e., women’s share of the labor force participation). 
 
Among other types of measures commonly used are the systematic measures calculated 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP; see table 1 for these measures). The 
two measures of gender status are (i) Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) and (ii) Gender-
related Development Index (GDI). Here is how UNDP describes these two indices: 
 
  
                                                 
3
 In traditional patriarchal settings, one important way for women to gain higher status and have more decision mak-
ing power within their families is by bearing sons and eventually becoming the senior female when sons marry. 
Daughters-in-law then take the lower status and the mother-in-law gains more power because of her age and status 
in the family. 
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Table 1.  
Political leadership indicators and GDI in the MENA region compared with other regions 
Country 
 
Percentage of  











GDI rank  
(2003) 
Algeria 7 6 5 107 
Bahrain — 0 1 37 
Egypt 2 2 5 120 
Iran 4 3 1 106 
Iraq 11 8 0 — 
Jordan 1 6 1 90 
Kuwait 0 0 5 46 
Lebanon 2 2 0 83 
Libya — — 5 61 
Morocco 1 11 6 126 
Oman — — 4 79 
Qatar — — 0 44 
Saudi Arabia — 0 0 73 
Syria 10 12 3 110 
Tunisia 7 23 8 91 
Turkey 2 4 13 96 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 48 





    
World 12 16 11 — 
More developed 14 20 14 — 
North America 14 17 32 — 
Europe 15 20 12 — 
Less developed 11 14 9 — 
Less developed  
(excluding China) 
9 13 9 — 
Africa 9 13 9 — 
Northern Africa 4 9 — — 






















Notes: Data for Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) are not available for most of the MENA countries. The top ten countries with the 
highest Gender-related Development Index (GDI) rank are: Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Australia, U.S.A., Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, and Finland. 
MENA: Middle East and North African region. 
Source: Women of Our World. 2002, 2005. Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C.; United Nations Development Fund: 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/pdf/hdr03_table_22.pdf. Retrieved on August 30, 2007; 2005 World Development 
Indicators, Women in Development, World Bank. 
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1. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) is a “composite index measuring gender 
inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment—economic participation and 
decision-making, political participation and decision-making and power over economic 
resources.” 
2. Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is a composite index measuring average 
achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index—a 
long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living—adjusted to account for 
inequalities between men and women (UNDP, Human Development Indicators, 2003). 
 
A low number indicates a high GDI rank. For example, the United States’ GDI is 7, 
which translates to it having a high GDI (women have access to more resources and exercise 
more decision making in the United States) compared with a GDI of 148 for Yemen or 126 for 
Morocco indicating a low access to resources and limited choices for women. Most of the 
MENA countries rank low according to this index. The four Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates) rank under 50, while countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, 
Syria, and Yemen, rank over 100 (indicator of low access to resources, limited choices and high 
level of gender inequality). 
As useful as these measures appear to be, they have been criticized as not being an 
accurate measure of gender inequality. Also, these measures are not available for all countries, 
particularly many of the MENA countries. The main critique of these measures comes from 
Pillarisetti and McGillivray’s study (1998) of the indices. Although they acknowledge the 
importance of these indices to measure gender empowerment and equity from a cross-cultural 
perspective, they list problems with the measurements as follows: 
 
 These measures of the treatment of inequality aversion are insensitive to differential 
cultural and social norms across countries (especially between industrialized and 
traditional developing countries). 
 They do not consider some important empirical realities concerning the size of the 
manufacturing sector in developing countries and the reliability of developing country 
databases. 
 They ignore some fundamental variables relevant to empowerment. (p. 202) 
 
 
A Multi-dimensional Approach to the Conundrum of Women’s Status in the MENA 
Region 
There is no uniform evidence throughout the MENA to back up the mainstream view that 
the low status of Muslim women and the injunction with “out of the norm” demographic patterns 
such as low participation of women in the labor force, low participation in politics, and so on, is 
a consequence of Islam to the extent it is perceived to be. Granted, religious doctrine can be used 
in a more totalitarian fashion by those in power to justify and rationalize the subjugation of 
women, and limit their access to opportunity—the Taliban in Afghanistan offer a prime 
example—but these more extreme interpretations of Islam do not reflect the broader community 
any more than the practices of Christian fundamentalist reflect the overall practice of most 
Christians. 
Jeffery and Jeffery (1997), Iyer (2002), and Bose (2005) in studying South Asian 
communities, find a stronger link between women’s autonomy in decision-making with their 
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social class, accessibility to family planning programs, educational attainment, regional and 
residential differences than with their religious affiliations to Islam, Hinduism, or any other 
religion.  
Obermeyer (1994), in studying the impact of Islam on fertility behavior in Iran and 
Tunisia, concludes that changes in the reproductive behavior in these countries is a consequence 
of governmental policy changes with the expedient support of the religious community rather 
than the population’s intrinsic religious beliefs. By addressing economic, social, and cultural 
barriers through the educational system and the media and in conjunction with religion, 
governments have played an important role in facilitating the use of health and family planning 
services in Muslim countries. In Egypt, for example, religious leaders sent out messages of 
fatwas (religious rulings) in favor of modern contraception. Government health care facilities 
distribute contraceptive devices and made them available to couples from all levels of economic 
and social classes. (Obermeyer 1994; Roudi-Fahimi 2004; Roudi-Fahimi & Kent 2007) 
The success of family planning programs supported by the Iranian government and the 
cooperation of the religious leaders is progressive in that the sole focus is not on a woman’s 
responsibility for reducing fertility, they also place a great deal of importance on the man’s roles 
in reducing fertility. Larsen (2001) states: 
 
One of the strengths of Iran’s promotion of family planning is the involvement of 
men. Iran is the only country in the world that requires both men and women to 
take a class on modern contraception before receiving a marriage license. And it 
is the only country in the region with a government-sanctioned condom factory. 
In the past four years, some 220,000 Iranian men have had a vasectomy. While 
vasectomies still account for only 3 percent of contraception, compared with 
female sterilization at 28 percent, men nonetheless are assuming more 
responsibility for family planning. (p. 2) 
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Yemeni government has made limited effort to 
control and prevent the country’s high fertility rate, high child mortality rate, and high maternal 
mortality; in fact, they deploy ideologies in the name of Islam to reinforce the rule of high 
fertility. Yemen has the least favorable demographic record (high fertility, high mortality, low 
women’s status, low level of industrialization, low women’s employment, no participation of 
women in politics) compared to other MENA countries. A large percentage of Yemeni women 
believe that Islam does not condone use of contraception. Therefore Yemeni women and men are 
reluctant to use birth control methods as it is considered “un-Islamic” to do so. Since Yemen has 
such a poor record on health care and high mortality rates, a high rate of fertility is necessary to 
replace the population.  
Demographic studies comparing Muslim and non-Muslim communities in India, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines ask whether there is a religion-based difference between 
those communities regarding fertility related decisions—whether or not to have more children, 
whether or not to use contraception, and so on (Morgan et al., 2002). The study finds that the 
important variable is not Muslim versus non-Muslim, but rather of age at first marriage, 
employment outside the house, and number of years of schooling; a greater level of autonomy 
(indicator of women’s social status) in both types of communities leads to reduced fertility rates 
(Morgan et al., 2002). The study concluded no religion-based difference between the two groups 
and their fertility levels and women’s decision-making power (again, an indicator of women’s 
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status within the household and family). Olmsted (2003, 2005), in her study of the MENA 
countries, examines what she calls the “fertility puzzle.” She tests variables such as income, 
government policies, women’s labor force participation, and cultural factors and, like Morgan et 
al. (2002), finds that female education and age at marriage are among the most significant factors 
in determining fertility levels. Thus, Islam alone does not affect women’s fertility patterns. 
Clearly, Islam plays a role in regulating women’s social status, however, it is more 
important to study how Islam is used as an instrument of control in response to forces originating 
in the region’s cultural history, and how political and economic realities (domestic and global) 
take advantage of the region’s Islamic roots to control the population in accordance with the 
needs of the governing elite.  
 
 
A Closer Look at the Path of Social and Economic Change  
 Much of the Middle East and North Africa gained independence from Western European 
imperialism and foreign rule shortly after World War II. The influence of European colonialism, 
however, was supplanted by the growing influence of the United States and the former Soviet 
Union. After the fall of communism, the United States emerged as the dominant foreign power in 
the Middle East and through its reach into the oil industry it contributed to the political turmoil 
that had been smoldering since the 1940s. The region experienced rapid economic development 
during the 1950s, and the oil boom of the 1970s contributed to further economic, political, and 
demographic changes. With oil prices soaring in the 1970s, “it was like drawing the winning 
global lottery ticket; from being the poorest countries in the world, the Gulf States found 
themselves among the wealthiest” (Hijab, 1988: 36). 
During economic and demographic transitions, new ways of life result from the changes 
in a society’s values and norms as well as its demographic characteristics: fertility and mortality 
levels decline (refer to classical modernization perspective); often times, age of marriage 
increases (which in turn can contribute to lower fertility and a higher educational level); the 
occupational structure of the society changes and educational opportunities for its citizens 
increase. Changes such as these are expected to bring more opportunities and comfort to 
women’s lives, especially when they are followed by reduced fertility and household 
responsibilities. Women’s participation in the labor force is expected to decline during the early 
transitional stages (from pre-industrial agriculture to industrial manufacturing economy) and pick 
up momentum when the society enters the postindustrial service economy stage. As the formal 
labor market grows during the early stages and agricultural sector jobs decline, more women 
leave agricultural work. However, the absence of jobs for women in the early manufacturing 
economy leads to an overall decline in women’s employment.4 Later on, with job growth in the 
service and white-collar occupations, women’s labor force participation increases again. The 
transition from a preindustrial agriculture economy to an early industrial urbanized economy, 
and later to postindustrial economy, is explained by modernization perspective as having a U-
shaped effect on women’s labor force participation. Thus, there is a curvilinear rather than a 
linear relationship between economic development and female employment (for quantitative 
analysis see Haghighat, 2002, 2009; Pampel and Tanaka, 1986). 
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 See For more information on modernization perspective, see the works of the following: Anker and Hein, 1986; 
Black and Cottrell, 1981; Boserup, 1970; Evans and Timberlake, 1980; Inkles and Smith, 1972; Kentor, 1981; Levy, 
1996; Moore, 1979; Oakley, 1974; Parson, 1971; Ryan, 1975; Semyonov, 1980; Tilly and Scott, 1978. 
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Challenging the Conventional Modernization Perspective 
Feminist critiques point to significant weakness in the modernization perspective; 
although widely applied, it has not been able to explain women’s status and the demographic 
changes influencing their lives in some parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East. 
Several decades ago, Ester Boserup’s work Women’s Role in Economic Development (1970) 
challenged modernization and particularly the perspective that technology liberates women and 
therefore has positive consequences on women’s status. She argued that urbanization (as a 
consequence of modernization) encourages rural-urban migration and the urban setting is less 
favorable for employed women; they are often cut off from their rural kinship support networks. 
Before leaving their rural life, women could count on multigenerational kinship support for 
illnesses, child care, household duties, and shared financial support of the family. Once leaving 
that environment for the urban life, they are alone or with a husband, with fewer or no extended 
family in the vicinity for support, and they also have to purchase all social services (daycare, 
health care, and housing). Furthermore, as reported by Luo (2005), while a change in the 
economy made it favorable for women to migrate and enter the workforce, persistence of the 
traditional cultural barriers to women subjected them to significant wage discrimination. 
Other perspectives have been offered to explain the lack of women in the workforce in 
the Muslim Middle Eastern countries. For example, the sociocultural perspective explains 
women’s lower participation in the modern sector—regardless of a woman’s qualifications or a 
demand for labor—as a result of powerful cultural norms, particularly the strong kinship system, 
the patrilineal descent tradition, and patriarchal norms that discourage women from entering the 
labor force and participating in the modern sector of the economy. 
 
 
Patriarchy, Bargaining with Patriarchy, Neo-patriarchy 
Patriarchy is considered a system that enables men to dominate women and maintain 
power and control of resources. Women—especially younger ones—have minimal power and 
are dependent on men.5 Kandiyoti (1992) defines classic patriarchy as the systematic inequality 
of women in societies. She describes a patriarchal family as multigenerational and hierarchical, 
where younger women and children are placed in the lowest level of the hierarchy. The 
paterfamilias, as she calls it, is characterized by young women marrying men older than 
themselves (frequently significantly older). When the young bride enters the new household, 
she is placed at the lowest level of the hierarchy with the least amount of power. Upon bearing 
sons, she gains more status and eventually, by becoming a mother-in-law, she gains more power 
as an older female in the household. Marrying young girls is important because it legitimately 
extends the length of time that they can bear children. A young woman is also more readily 
socialized to her unequal role and inequitable entitlement to the family resources—even 
compared to her own children (Kandiyoti, 1992; Moghadam, 2004). Women’s modesty and the 
practice of veiling, Hijab or Purdah, are also emphasized in patriarchal societies. Within a 
community, a woman’s honor is an extension of the family’s honor and reputation. What do 
women gain from their lower status with these inferior arrangements? In exchange for their low 
status and unequal access to resources, women are entitled to protection and maintenance. 
Kandiyoti refers to this exchange as the “patriarchal bargains.” Women find strategies within 
                                                 
5
 See Mason (1986, 1996, 2001) 
282 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 1  January 2013 
acceptable set of norms and rules to negotiate their status and position in the family and in the 
society and make compromises with male members in their lives.  
Johnson (1997) describes four dimensions of a patriarchal social structure. He argues that 
these structures are: 
1. Male domination—men predominantly hold the most prestigious and powerful roles 
and women hold the least powerful roles. 
2. Patriarchal control—women are devalued and experience physical, psychological control, 
violence and fear of violence in their everyday lives because of the ideological need for 
men’s control, supervision, and protection. 
3. Male identified—most aspects of society that are highly valued and rewarded are 
associated with men and identified with male characteristics. Any other attributes less 
valued and rewarded are associated with women. 
4. Male centricity—public attention (e.g., the media, public spaces) is often granted to men 
and women are placed in the background and on the margins. 
 
Hughes et al. (1999) describe patriarchy as an institution where gender inequality is 
perpetuated by a set of complex processes referred to as sexism: 
 
The most pervasive form of institutional sexism is patriarchy, a system of social 
organizations in which men have a disproportionate share of power. Patriarchy is 
rooted in cultural and legal systems that historically gave fathers authority in 
family and kin/clan matters, made wives and children dependent on husbands and 
fathers, and organized descent and inheritance through the male line.” (p. 250) 
 
The influence of patriarchy on women’s societal resources is seen as a complex 
phenomenon. For instance, on the demand side, patriarchal values embedded in the culture 
discourage employers from hiring women and investing in them (e.g., Papanek, 1990). 
Therefore, in many of the societies with strong patrilineal descent and strong extended family 
and kinship systems (e.g., Middle East, South and East Asia) tend to keep women out of the 
labor force.6  
 
 
Patriarchy Meets Modernity: The Neo-patriarchy Perspective 
Sharabi (1988) describes neo-patriarchy as the side-effect of the encounter between 
modernity and tradition. Neo-patriarchy could explain the discrepancy between industrialization, 
the absence of an increase of women in public life, and their continued lower status. With respect 
to gender roles, a woman’s primary role as homemaker and mother (not far removed from 
traditional patriarchy) remains a strong marker of the cultural norms. Therefore, changes in the 
level of industrialization have little effect on women’s social status and overall involvement 
outside of their familial and kinship circles. Furthermore, Sharabi (1988) reminds us of the 
influence of the oil wealth entangled with patriarchy in the Middle East region. Also, Sharabi 
reminds us further that only Western societies experienced modernization in a “pure” sense 
because it happened without interference from other nations. Due to their dependent political and 
economic positions and their cultural differences, a long history of Western colonialism, on-
                                                 
6 See for example Greenhalgh, 1985; Jones, 1984; Pyle, 1990; Salaff, 1981.  
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going interference of the Western world in the MENA’s economic and political systems (mainly 
due to oil wealth in the region), modernization in today’s Middle East has followed a different 
path. 
Sharabi (1988) expresses the two main concepts of neo-patriarchy as being (i) 
patriarchy (cultural), and (ii) dependency (economic). Its economic structure is dependent 
capitalism3 and its social structure is patriarchy. Neo-patriarchy is the product of the 
interaction between modernity and patriarchy (tradition) in the context of dependent 
capitalism. In neo-patriarchal societies, there is a wide gap between inward and outward 
societal context. Kinship and culture in these societies are deeply rooted in patriarchal values 
(inward) even with the presence of modern forms of government and economic development 
strategy (outward). Sharabi concludes that this strategy became financially possible mainly 
because of the sudden accumulation of oil revenues and other investment strategies. In neo-




Patriarchy as a Political and Economic Expedient 
 
Moghadam (1993, 2004) applies the neo-patriarchal framework to the legal and political 
status of women in Muslim societies. She writes: 
 
Neopatriarchal state practices build upon and reinforce particular normative views 
of women and the family, often, but not exclusively, through the law. In 
particular, laws that render women legal minors and dependents of men reflect 
and perpetuate a modernized form of patriarchy. In some cases, the focus on 
women is an attempt to deflect attention from economic failures. States may also 
find it useful to foster patriarchal structures because the extended family performs 
vital welfare functions. (p. 14) 
 
A similar argument by Obermeyer (1992) focuses on the politics of fertility, mortality, and 
female labor force participation in Arab Muslim nations and states: 
 
The ambivalence of any Arab/Muslim leaders toward female emancipation stems 
from their need to address two conflicting demands in their societies: prosperity, 
which means modernization; and identity, which is partly rooted in tradition . . . 
the traditional bases of identity present themselves as the safest choice, and 
religion is used selectively to cope with political exigencies and to legitimize the 
power of individual leaders. (p. 52) 
 
Hijab (1994) also argues that patriarchal values and messages in the name of Islam are 
used selectively to suppress women’s rights when it is actually more of an economic decision 
justified and reinforced by traditional values when that makes the most political and economic 
sense. She presents studies of countries such as Tunisia and Iraq where the role of the 
government in social attitudes toward women’s employment changed when their labor was in 
demand. For example, Iraq’s need for workers was so pressing that the government imported 
over a million Egyptians to be employed in the agricultural sector. The Iraqi government also 
284 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 1  January 2013 
made special efforts to change social attitudes toward women’s involvement in the public sector 
through media and elite channels. Hijab gives the example of a pharmaceutical plant north of 
Baghdad where female workers had to be brought in from Baghdad and housed in dormitories 
because the plant was not able to hire women from the nearby village as local women were not 
allowed by their male family members to work in the factory. The villagers were resentful of the 
new plant. Sometimes the buses transporting women from Baghdad were attacked. Gradually, 
attitudes changed and women from the villages started to seek work in the factory themselves, 
first being chaperoned by their male relatives and finally going to work on their own.  
Hijab also cites the example of Tunisia where the government had been eager to integrate 
women into the modern labor force up until the unemployment of men became a serious problem. 
She states that the male unemployment problem became so serious that the state could not afford to 
consider the needs of both men and women. The government “was clearly happy to adopt the 
traditional view that men were the breadwinners and had to be planned for accordingly, and that 
women were the economic responsibility of their men folks” (p. 81). In times of high 
unemployment the government’s inability to grow the economy in order to create jobs or provide 
social benefits replacing women’s services becomes the real reason for reverting to “traditional 
ways.” In essence, to avert a sociopolitical crisis due to a failing economy, the government may 
fall back on the Islamic excuse to exclude women from competing with men for jobs by claiming 
that traditional gender roles must be preserved. Religion becomes the justification and allows the 
government to preserve itself by not having to admit its inability to provide jobs and revenue. 
To sum up, it seems that once women’s labor in the modern sector is in demand, 
government responds to the need by integrating women into the modern workforce. Islamic 
ideology as a conservative factor to suppress women’s equal access to the modern sectors is 
manipulated when the society is facing a high rate of male unemployment. Government officials 
engineer this strategy as a way to deflect attention from economic failures. The state may find 
patriarchal structures politically and economically useful because the extended family performs 
vital functions.  
 
 
Is Labor Force Participation Empowering and Liberating for Women? 
Returning to the discussion of women’s social status, access to resources and the process 
of empowerment, we know that labor force participation is associated with women’s 
empowerment because of the access it provides to societal resources. Most of the feminist 
literature, as well as reports from the World Bank and the United Nations, portray women’s 
contribution to productive resources as the main ingredient for their empowerment and higher 
status. Dubeck and Dunn (2002), in their study of women’s work, list many reasons for 
examining women’s employment. They argue that women’s paid work is not only good for 
individual women (it is empowering and status enhancing) but also beneficial to the collective 
well-being of the society. Working women contribute to the production of goods and services but 
their participation in the workforce extends beyond advancing personal economics to the creation 
of jobs and new industries. For example, family and educational institutions are intensely 
affected by women’s employment since employed women are not able to perform every familial 
task themselves. Therefore their services are often replaced by the development of new 
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industries, such as child and elderly care institutions, extended school days for children, janitorial 
services, the growth of the fast food and restaurant industry, and so on.
7
 
It has also been argued that women’s entry into the workforce strengthens their position 
in the political system, helping them understand their rights and boosting their political 
participation both individually and collectively.
8
 Oftentimes grassroots organizations are formed 
by and for women to protect their interests in countries where they work in low-wage factory 
jobs. These countries include Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Tunisia, and Morocco 
(Moghadam, 1999; Ross, 2008, 2012; Telhami et al., 2009). Studies of female garment workers 
in Bangladesh indicate that when women work side by side in factories, these locations become 
fertile grounds for sharing information and building social networks. For example, from these 
social networks, women learn about health-related issues and become more aware of 
contraceptive choices (Amin et al., 1998; Kabeer and Mahmud, 2004). 
So, is paid employment empowering and liberating for women? The answer is it can be, 
but employment is sometimes disempowering and exploitative of women. Olmsted (2005), in her 
analysis of paid work in the Arab nations, states: 
 
Paid employment for women is no panacea, either for women themselves or for 
society in general. Even when they enter paid employment, women often remain 
more economically vulnerable than men, not only because they face 
discrimination and exploitative work conditions, but also because societies 
continue to assign them the generally unremunerated economic role of 
reproductive labor. (p. 112) 
 
The subject of employment and its role in advancing women’s social status is complicated. The 
nature of the work and the ability to advance within the job are also important variables (echoing 
back to Kabeer’s ideas of agency and achievement). There is no doubt that women in many parts 
of the world are often exploited by their employers and oftentimes by their own family members, 
where they are used as unpaid and subjugated labor. It is also worth pointing out that there are 
actually cases in which women’s participation in the workforce is counterproductive. Women 
from lower socioeconomic status groups who end up in lower class jobs find their social status is 
further diminished. Sassen (1999) and Parrenas (2000, 2001) explain this as a phenomenon of the 
global labor market.  
 
 
The Impact of Fertility and Women’s Employment 
The MENA region has succeeded in lowering its fertility rate for the past several decades 
(see Haghighat, 2010). Access to reproductive health care facilities helps reduce fertility, leads to 
rising employment participation, and can increase women’s autonomy and social status. And yet, 
in many of the countries in the MENA region, women’s employment drops when they enter 
marriage and the childbearing years since their primary role is considered to be caring for their 
                                                 
7
 See For more information on modernization perspective, see the works of the following: Anker and Hein, 1986; 
Black and Cottrell, 1981; Boserup, 1970; Evans and Timberlake, 1980; Inkles and Smith, 1972; Kentor, 1981; Levy, 
1996; Moore, 1979; Oakley, 1974; Parson, 1971; Ryan, 1975; Semyonov, 1980; Tilly and Scott, 1978. 
8
 However, their strength within the political sphere can also be curtailed when those jobs disappear. For example, 
women’s involvement in the workforce (and their up-tick in social mobility and social liberation—wearing pants 
and performing skilled labor) in the U.S. during WWII was specific to that time period and was followed by a con-
servative period with a return to the cult of domesticity in the 1950s, 
286 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 14, No. 1  January 2013 
family, per the strong patriarchal traditions of the region, and alternatives for care are not 
available due to the lack of government-provided social services. Wahba (2003: 26) reports the 
following: 
 
1. In Egypt, women’s employment drops as soon as they enter marriage and their 
childbearing years (Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2002). 
2. In Iran, married women have the lowest rate of participation compared to single and 
widowed women. Divorced women have the highest rate of participation in the labor 
force (Salehi-Isfahani, 2000a). 
3. In Kuwait, single women between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-nine have twice the 
labor force participation as married women (30 versus 60 percent) (Shah and Al-Qudsi, 
1990). 
 
In many MENA societies, reproductive behavior is a function of the sociopolitical 
context rather than the impact of the Islamic influence. Islam does not prohibit the practice of 
family planning and does not encourage high fertility. The pro-natalist orientation of Islam is 
based not on direct injunctions, but indirectly through the political conditions created which are 
conducive to high fertility (Obermeyer, 1992). When governments act to remove economic, 
social, and cultural barriers, to facilitate the use of health and family planning services, fertility 
and mortality rates drop. Countries such as Algeria and Iran saw fertility decline dramatically 
while experiencing the rise and domination of Islamic fundamentalism (Fargues, 2003). 
Although the region is experiencing one of the highest population growth rates in the 
world, most countries in the MENA region have reduced their fertility (and mortality) rates 
drastically. However, the domino effect of those previously higher rates of fertility is that many 
of the MENA countries still have a disproportionately young population (often referred to as the 
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Estimated earned income  





    Female           Male 
Income disparity 




Female labor force  
participation 









(% of total labor force) 
 
1990         2000-4 
Female 
(% of female labor force) 
 
       1990        2000-04 
Algeria 2,784 9,329 30 20 23 30 19.8 29.8 15.9 29.7 
Bahrain 7,578 22,305 34 11 17 19 - - - - 
Egypt 1,970 5,075 39 19 26 22 8.6 11 17.9 23.9 
Iran 2,599 9,301 28 20 20 33 - 11.6 - 20.4 
Iraq — — — 16 17 19 - 28.1 - 16 
Jordan 1,771 5,800 31 18 19 24 - 13.2 - 20.7 
Kuwait 8,605 25,333 34 13 22 25 - - - - 
Lebanon 1,963 6,472 30 28 32 30 - - - - 
Libya — — — 16 17 26 - - - - 
Morocco 2,057 5,139 40 21 24 25 15.8 10.8 - - 
Oman 3,919 17,960 22 15 11 16 - - - - 
Qatar — — — 9 10 14 - 3.9 - 12.6 
Saudi Arabia 4,222 21,141 20 8 11 15 - 5.2 - 11.5 
  Syria 1,423 5,109 27 23 26 30 - 11.7 - 24.1 
Tunisia 3,377 9,359 36 19 21 27 15.3 14.3 - - 
Turkey 3,717 8,023 46 35 29 26 8.0 10.3 8.5 9.7 
United Arab 
Emirates 
6,041 28,223 21 5 10 13 - 2.3 - 2.6 




          
MENA - - - 20 - 27 - 13.6 - - 
Lower Middle 
Income 
- - - 41 - 42 3.9 5.9 - - 
High Income - - - 39 - 44 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4 
U.S.A. 26,389 45,540 58 41    44 46 5.6 6.4 6.8 6.6 
Source:  
The World Bank Group, GenderStats, Database of Gender Statistics, http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=profile&cty=BHR,Bahrain&hm=home. Retrieved on August 30, 2007 
 
2005 World Development Indicators, Women in Development, table 1.5 
Human Development Report 2003, Table 22, Gender-related development 
The World Bank Group, GenderStats, Database of Gender Statistics, http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/genderRpt.asp?rpt=profile&cty=BHR,Bahrain&hm=home. Retrieved on August 30, 2007 
* Income disparity is calculated as (female income/male income) * 100. 
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The Inequality of the Education = Work Equation in the MENA Region 
A strong relationship between increased access to education and positive changes in 
women’s status is expected in the MENA region but that does not seem to reflect reality. A 
society’s investment in education is generally assumed to pay off in the creation of more jobs 
(mainly in the nonagricultural sector) and better-educated individuals in the workforce. For a 
society to receive returns on its investments on education, it needs to build a skilled and flexible 
labor force. The high rate of women’s access to secondary and higher education in most of the 
MENA region is impressive. Contrary to expectations, however, the MENA region’s substantial 
investment in education has not been paying off as expected. There is little evidence that 
education has contributed to economic growth in the region (Nabli, 2002). As women’s 
education level has increased in the MENA region, their labor force participation has not 
increased as expected. An examination of labor force statistics indicates that female labor force 
participation is relatively low in the MENA region, and ranges from 13 percent of the total labor 




As of year 2000, women’s formal employment in the MENA region was as low as 27 
percent, which is accompanied by a staggering unemployment rate—sometimes as high as 30 
percent (refer to Table 3). Within the region, the GCC countries show the lowest rate of women’s 
employment. The low rate of women’s employment (despite their improved educational 
attainment and lower fertility) results from the absence of a commensurate improvement in 
women’s social status (Lattouf, 2004; Shavarini, 2006). Despite women’s high levels of 
education, governments enforce traditional roles and values on women—a direct consequence of 
economic stagnation and regional political problems—effectively delimiting their social 
mobility. There is no doubt that women’s access to higher education contributes to improving 
their individual status. As previously mentioned, Lattouf’s observation that, despite the 
questionable rate of economic return, families support their daughter’s higher education as a way 
to improve their daughter’s chances of finding a suitable husband of a similar or higher social 
status—but this continues to confine the “improvement” to the familial/kinship level. If a 
woman’s higher education does not confer an improved status on a societal level, her higher 
education credentials will not help her to get far in the job market.  
Among the younger generation, the gap in educational attainment between women and 
men has narrowed tremendously in the MENA region (Haghighat, 2010). Many educated women 
are marrying later and having fewer children. In theory, higher education for women should lead 
to more employment opportunities. And yet, Bahramitash (2007), in her study of contemporary 
Iranian women and the changes in their social status over the past decades, points to a lack of 
connection between education and employment. Fundamentally, Iranian society has not been 
able to provide jobs for many of these women. The unemployment rate was as high as 20 percent 
for females and 12 percent for males in 2000–2004. Algeria, as another example, reports its 
unemployment rate for both men and women increasing and staying unusually high (30 percent 
                                                 
9
 Bahrain (19 percent), Oman (16 percent), Qatar (14 percent), Saudi Arabia (15 percent), UAE (13 per-
cent), five of the six Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries excluding Kuwait (25 percent), show the lowest 
share of female employment. The Kuwaiti government has managed to create jobs and include women in their labor 
force. Women are heavily employed in government positions (clerical, teaching, and nursing). Over 90 percent of 
the Kuwaiti female labor force is employed in the public sector. Although Kuwait still uses a large number of guest 
workers as part of its labor force, other GCC countries are heavier users of guest workers. The impact of guest 
workers on employment statistics will be explained in detail in this article. 
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for both between 2000 and 2004) (see Table 2 for available unemployment statistics). It is all 
well and good to educate women, but if the underlying economy cannot support more workers an 
advanced education does not necessarily offer an advantage. Furthermore, in recent decades, the 
poverty rate among women has increased dramatically due to higher inflation, higher male and 
female unemployment rates, and higher incidences of women not marrying, marrying later, or 
getting divorced, which leaves them without a male to support them financially. Rising poverty 
rates and high inflation force many educated and less educated women to seek employment. But 
the question becomes at what level are they finding employment? Employed workers are often 
concentrated in particular sectors that contribute to gender segregation in the labor force. Female 
concentrated jobs are often lower status and lower paying jobs. In general, women are 
concentrated in public sectors in most of the MENA region. More than 50 percent of employed 
women in Jordan and Egypt and over 90 percent in Kuwait, for example, are public sector 
employees (Wahba, 2003). If women, both educated and non-educated, are competing for low 
wages, low status jobs then Bahramitash (2007) argues that working “does not necessarily 
translate into economic empowerment for women” (p. 104). Simply because statistically more 
women are working does not mean they are seeing improvements in their wages or that overall 
they are a more economically empowered group. Rising employment for women in Iran and 
other countries in the region could be indicative of “economic exploitation rather than economic 
empowerment.” (p. 104)10 
Table 2 shows patterns of women’s employment and unemployment from 1980 to 1990 
and 2000–2004. In fifteen out of eighteen cases, female labor force participation has increased 
between 1980 and 2004. In Turkey we see a steady decline. In Egypt and Lebanon we see an 
initial increase between 1980 and 1990 followed by a decline by 2004. The same data, grouped 
by region, shows that overall in the MENA region female labor force participation has increased, 
as is also witnessed in the United States. The lowest rate of female employment in the MENA 
region in 2000–2004 belongs to UAE (13 percent) and Saudi Arabia (15 percent). The highest 
rates are reported for Iran (33 percent), Algeria, Lebanon, and Syria (all 30 percent). Female 
labor force participation for the MENA region is as low as 27 percent. Despite the relative levels 
of rising employment for women, unemployment rates in the MENA region for both men and 
women are among the highest in the world indicating a high demand and a low supply of jobs. In 
Iran women’s employment rate is 33 percent—the highest in the region (still low compared to 
countries in other regions) and the female unemployment rate is over 20 percent. In Syria the 
labor force participation of women is 30 percent, and the unemployment rate for women is 24 
percent (a pattern similar to Iran). While the unemployment rate in high income countries is 
slightly lower for women than for men (6.8 percent for men and 6.6 for women in the United 
States), in the MENA region, women’s employment rate is much lower than men’s and their 
unemployment rate is much higher than men’s. The highest recorded unemployment rates among 
these countries belong to Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. These countries also have 
                                                 
10A major motivator for the globalization of the economy is cost-cutting—the relocation of work from affluent 
nations to less-developed nations where labor and operating expenses are less. Roberts and Hite (2000) point to a 
paradoxical effect on women’s status when developed nations invest and create jobs in less-developed nations. In 
the beginning they notice that the jobs created yield earning power for women with the immediate effect of 
improving their quality of life. In addition it provides women with the opportunity for independence, material 
benefits, and to a certain extent a sense of self-actualization. However women employed in the foreign factories 
begin to see the disadvantages of working for a transnational corporation as they become marginalized and 
exploited, often working in oppressive work conditions, without job security, and low wages. 
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a higher percentage of college educated women among their younger population (with the 
exception of Iraq). Consequently, unemployment rate is further complicated by age; the younger 
generation of men and women are experiencing even higher unemployment rate in the MENA 
region than the older age groups. Roudi-Fahimi and Kent (2007) express this concern: 
 
While less than 15 percent of young men and women were unemployed 
worldwide, the ILO estimated that just over 20 percent of young men and just 
over 30 percent of young women in MENA were unemployed in 2005. The 
situation is particularly dire for members of MENA’s youth bulge in some 
countries. More than 40 percent of Algeria’s young men and women were 
unemployed in 2005, which may be why so many Algerians are emigrating [sic] 
to Europe and elsewhere in search of jobs. Between 21 percent and 31 percent of 
young men were unemployed in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and several other 
MENA countries, along with between 29 percent and 50 percent of young 
women. Qatar, with a labor force dominated by foreign male workers, has 
relatively low unemployment for young men, but high unemployment for young 
women.” (p. 17) 
 
Income disparity between men and women in the MENA region is even more prevalent 
(Table 2). For example, Kuwaiti men earn three times more than women, Omani men four times 
more, Saudi men five times more. In contrast, there is a much smaller gap between men and 
women’s earnings in the United States, Norway, and Sweden. 
 
 
Societal Norms, Social Contracts, and Women’s Employment 
Societies often have an implicit set of norms indicating how individuals should be cared 
for through the traditions of family and religion. For example, the patriarchal system gives men 
the ultimate control of the family members but also assigns them the responsibility of providing 
for their immediate and often extended families (elderly parents, sisters, nieces, and nephews in 
addition to their own nuclear family). Some interpretations of Sharia law state that men are 
economically responsible for women but women do not have the obligation to provide unpaid 
housework and have the right to be compensated for their work, and married women do not have 
an obligation to contribute to the household income. A study of women’s paid employment and 
financial arrangements with their families in the United Arab Emirates shows that employed 
(mainly more affluent middle and upper middle class) married women were in control of their 
own money and did not have the obligation to share their income with their husbands. The 
expectation is that men are in charge of their family’s finances but women are not obligated to 
work or share their income if they do work (Briegel and Zivkovic, 2008).  
Societies also, to varying degrees, have explicit social contracts provided by the 
government. For example, governments set up tax systems in exchange for providing social 
services to their citizens. Members of a society might give up some things (certain rights, and 
monetary payments in the form of taxes) to their government in exchange for receiving social 
services. In societies with few or no explicit governmental social services, families and kinship 
systems perform these roles. For example, in Nordic countries with social democratic welfare 
regimes, the government takes responsibility for almost all social services including education, 
health, child, and elderly care. But in countries like those in the MENA region, with strong 
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patriarchal family systems, societies rely on families and kinship systems to provide the care for 
children, the ill, and the elderly. It is often argued that it is financially beneficial for governments 
to justify and perpetuate patriarchal family norms, as is the tradition in many of the Middle East, 
South and East Asian societies. 
Another interesting twist to the MENA societies’ women-work equation is that the 
relatively high male income levels made possible by the oil boom, directly or indirectly by 
means of remittances, “contributed to the preservation of the patriarchal family structure by 
making it [financially] unnecessary for women to seek paid employment outside the home” 
(Wahba 2003: 26). 
Integrating women (and I underline “integration” and not exclusion or exploitation of 
their labor)
11
 into the paid workforce will be advanced by a society if it is not facing economic 
and political failures and can support both men and women with jobs and social services. When 
the country is facing political turmoil and economic breakdowns along with a disproportionately 
young population to support, women’s employment is not a priority. In those instances all sorts 
of cultural norms and ideological messages will be used to justify keeping women at home to 
attend to their families’ care and well-being. Frequently however, women of lower 
socioeconomic status do not have the strong familial support and the societal system is also ill-
equipped to protect them. 
 
 
Labor Migration, Oil and the Impact on Women’s Employment 
Prior to the 1970s, a relatively small pool of foreign labor existed in the Middle East. 
Americans and Europeans held jobs in the oil export industry. Pakistanis, Sudanese, Egyptians, 
and Palestinians were often employed as doctors, nurses, and other professionals in small 
numbers. The foreign worker community was rather small but started to grow rapidly with 
soaring oil prices in the early 1970s (Martin and Widgren, 1996). Today, a majority of the 
foreign workers in the Middle East are from South Asia and neighboring Arab countries. The 
largest single source of foreign workers in the MENA region is from Egypt. Egyptians work in 
different parts of the Middle East, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. 
Other major labor exporting countries are Jordan, Yemen, and Sudan (Martin and Widgren, 
1996; Shah, 1995).
12
 By the 1990s nearly 70 percent of the GCC labor force consisted of foreign 
workers, with UAE’s foreign-born labor as high as 90 percent of their labor force (Table 3). In 
countries such as Kuwait and UAE foreign workers constitute 84 percent and 90 percent of the 
labor force (Table 3). Foreign-born labor constitutes 39 percent of the total population in the GCC 
but 70 percent of the labor force (Table 4). The extreme dependence of these countries on foreign 
labor is undeniable and would be very difficult to change. Shah (1995) explains the concerns 
regarding the high volume of migration and states that immigration is likely to continue in heavy 
volumes. Among the many reasons cited for the heavy flow of immigration are: (i) the need to 
maintain the infrastructure, (ii) the reluctance of the native labor force to participate in productive 
and manual labor, (iii) the increased demand for domestic servants (p. 1001). 
                                                 
11
 In general, dependency theorists would argue that the West has exploited and prospered through access to the 
MENA regions’ cheap petroleum production. MENA women only enter an exploiting workforce if needed and en-
forced by their country’s elite and multinational companies. 
12
 Migrant workers in the GCC countries dominate three main sectors of the economy: construction, manufacturing, 
and utilities. The greatest decline has been in the construction sector since the peak of the construction boom in the 
1970s and 1980s. In turn, the service sector has grown and absorbed a large percentage of immigrant workers (Birk et 
al., 1988). 
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Table 3.  
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GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council countries. 
Sources: (1) Willoughby (2005), table 2 and 7. (2) Shah (1995), table 1; World Bank Group, GenderStats database of gender 
statistics. 2006. Retrieved in August 12, 2006. http://devdata.worldbank.org/. 
 
 
Female migrant workers, with a variety of skill levels, also constitute a relatively large 
percentage of the foreign workers holding jobs. Many are illiterate or barely literate and 
perform janitorial and domestic work (mainly women from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka). Some are highly educated (mainly from other Arab countries such 
as Egypt) and hold jobs as teachers, nurses, and, sometimes, doctors serving the country’s 
female population. In many of these countries, the native population is overqualified or is not 
willing to take low paid and low status jobs. Shah (1995), in her description of the migrant and 
native population in Kuwait, states: 
 
As the educational level increases further among the Kuwaiti population, 
indigenous workers would be overqualified for occupations currently performed 
by illiterate foreign workers. Such jobs will be considered too lowly by nationals. 
Also in cultural terms, certain occupations (e.g., cleaning services) are now 
deemed to be purely non-Kuwaiti occupations, and participation in them would 
reduce the status of a Kuwaiti tremendously. (pp. 1016–1017) 
 
We should be reminded here that, MENA countries maintain a constant multifaceted effort 
to preserve the patriarchal system by limiting change in women’s status. For example, the GCC 
countries’ response to a significant loss of male laborers to more lucrative jobs across the borders 
was to bring in replacement male laborers from poorer or more overpopulated regional members. If 
GCC countries did not replace their male citizens who migrated to high paying positions in oil-
producing states with imported replacement labor, it might challenge the patriarchal system by 
encouraging women to enter the local labor force. One last effect of migration to high paying jobs 
outside the country is that the remittances sent home are in a higher valued currency, which helps 
create a higher standard of living for the families in the home country.  
The question then is (the patriarchal attitude aside): why haven’t labor shortages in 
labor importing countries led to a greater integration of women into the labor force as is 
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theoretically expected? According to Hijab (1988) three conditions are needed to promote 
women’s gainful employment in a country: need, opportunity, and ability. An absence of any 
of the three could lead to a slower pace or lower integration of women into the labor force. In 
the face of those criteria the MENA region falls short on several fronts. 
 
 Need: In oil-producing nations, sudden wealth meant a sharp rise in Gross National 
Product per capita. However, because of the high level of male income and the job 
security offered by the governments, women’s financial contribution was probably not 
felt to be needed by families. 
 Opportunity: Oil wealth also meant that the government could easily afford to hire 
foreign workers “despite the fact that this was felt to be a threat to the social fabric” 
(Hijab, 1988: 137). Migrant workers entering the MENA oil-producing states have the 
potential to bring cultural changes. To avoid this migrants are subject to government 
controls that deny them the right to marry local women, bring their families, or start a 
family during their employment. Not only are they denied citizenship from the host 
country, but they can be deported when their employment ends or is terminated. The 
perceived encroachment of foreign influences was probably the main factor reinforcing 
attachment to traditionalism’s particularly rigid interpretation of gender roles (Hijab, 
1994; Sharabi, 1988). Women’s roles in that context were defined as mothers and wives, 
which tend to deflect the opportunity for women to be economically active. 
 Ability: The sudden wealth created job opportunities in the modern sector (including 
jobs that were acceptable for domestic workers vs. migrant workers). For decades (until 
recently), women in general were not prepared with proper education and skills to enter 
the modern labor force due to the disparity between male and female education and skill 
levels. The education gap in the past few decades has narrowed. However, despite 
women’s great strides in educational achievement in the Middle East, they are kept out 
of the labor force due to reasons such as a government’s political and economic failures, 
high inflation and a population explosion. 
 
After accounting for the fact that the oil industry as a capital-intensive industry (due to its 
enormous wealth flow from oil) created many labor-intensive jobs in construction and oil 
industry suited for men (mainly taken by migrant workers), other reasons for the unchanging 
status of women vary from country to country in the MENA region. Governments in many of 
these countries insisted on preserving the patriarchal system, already in existence for centuries, 
in which women’s status was solely defined by successfully maintaining the family’s well-being. 
In other countries, a population explosion provided the labor force with more than enough men 
to fulfill the job market demands. If further labor was needed, it was imported from neighboring 
countries or South Asian countries with the legal stipulation that migrant workers could be 
denied citizenship and family rights, and sent home when no longer needed. And finally, some 
countries are still experiencing political and/or economic failures in growing a diversified 
economy. While the oil industry brought in much needed revenue and created some jobs, failure 
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The Dutch Disease Translated to Oil Rich Countries in the MENA Region and Women’s 
Employment 
Ross (2008) suggests that the under-representation of women in the workforce and 
politics is not because of Islam, but is due to the effect of petroleum on the economies of these 
countries. In addition, Ross explains the unusually low status of women in oil-producing 
countries outside of the Middle East region (e.g., Azerbaijan, Botswana, Chile, Nigeria, and 
Russia) as also being connected to oil and mineral production. In his analysis of oil-rich and oil-
poor countries, Ross emphasizes an economic condition called the Dutch Disease. The Dutch 
Disease describes the relationship between the decline in the manufacturing sector and 
exploitation of natural resources such as petroleum production and export of goods. With the 
increase in wealth and revenues from natural resources (oil in this case), the traditional sector—
also referred to as the traded sector (agriculture and manufacturing)—becomes less significant, 
while non-traded sectors (construction and services) becomes more significant in the economy 
(Corden and Neary, 1982). Ross adds another dimension to the Dutch Disease: gender 
segregation in the labor force. He argues that women are given opportunities to enter the labor 
force but are only allowed to enter specific jobs in specific sectors, which permits employers to 
set different wages for men and women—lower wages for women and higher for men. In oil-rich 
countries, with the expansion of the oil economy, the non-traded sector (construction and 
services) will get a boost and support from the government and therefore expand where there is a 
concentration of male workers. Also oil-rich economies tend to expand their heavy industry; 




The focus on women’s issues (emphasis on traditionalism in the name of Islam) has often 
been a political strategy for these nations to deflect attention from their economic failures: high 
inflation rate, a lack of ability to provide employment for everyone, and a lack of adequate social 
services.13 Religious ideology, cultural beliefs, and traditional principles cannot be argued to be 
the one and only reason for women’s labor force lagging behind in these countries. Countries 
such as Saudi Arabia, as one of the top oil producers of the world, did not require female labor in 
order to grow and develop economically (in a form of capital-intensive industry). Nor was there 
any incentive to employ indigenous women workers. It was cheaper to hire migrant laborers, and 
it was not in the best interest of the wealthy rulers or governments to be forced to supplement 
social services as would be needed if women moved out of the domestic arena. As Gross 
National Product continued to rise and to supply a relatively high level of income for men who 
were employed, it reinforced the attachment of these societies to traditionalism, conservatism, 
and Islamic fundamentalist ideology (Moghadam, 2004). While rapid population growth (as high 
as 3–4 percent) and high male and female unemployment, might have spurred change, the 
response was equally reactionary: keep women in their domestic roles according to and justified 
by custom, so there is less competition for available jobs. In response to economics, societies 
willingly and openly adopted Islamization of the state and embraced traditional gender roles. 
By contrast, countries such as Indonesia (oil-poor, majority Muslim) and Tunisia (no oil, 
majority Muslim) have developed their economy through labor-intensive industrial production 
and taken advantage of their female labor. Those countries are characterized by a higher rate of 
female labor force participation and women’s political participation (Ross, 2008). Studies have 
                                                 
13
 See Hijab, 1988; Moghadam, 1992b, 2004; Obermeyer, 1992 
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shown that women’s status improves when they become essential to the financial system; when 
the unstoppable forces of a growing and a diversified economy are able to provide jobs at least 
equal to the demand. The data for educational attainment by women in MENA show the effects 
of modernization as in recent decades, the percentage women enrolled in higher education 
(university) has increased significantly. Some MENA countries present the majority of university 
students as female. The family dynamics change from having many children to provide labor for 
the parents, to smaller families where the parents invest more in the children through education 
(quantity versus quality). In the latter case, there is a greater return when parents invest in a 
smaller number of children. Society also benefits from a more educated and smaller population. 
The solution to the future improvement in women’s status, as well as stabilization to the 
MENA region, is dependent on the next course of industrialization and modernization. The 
political and economic status quo is maintained by reinforcing historically patriarchal ideologies, 
but the need to maintain the status quo reflects an inadequate response by the government for 
economic development. Nor has embracing the status quo led to political stability and prosperity.  
Salehi-Isfahani (2000) points out how in Iran, the 1979 revolution against the government 
was born among the disenfranchised youth. Following the revolution, Iran’s fertility rate 
increased dramatically thus producing another, even larger, youth bulge. Hope, according to 
Salehi-Isfahani, lies in the government changing the country’s base of economic growth from oil, 
to “human capital.” The oil industry, based on a finite quantity of a natural resource, produced a 
financial windfall for the Iranian economy—not a sustainable economic model. This is also true 
for the other major oil-producing nations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Wherever there is a tight relationship between per capita income and oil exports, 
further complicated by rapid population growth, social and political scientists will see the 
potential for civil unrest and instability. And it is clear that an oil export based economy can have 
adverse effects on women’s status. 
Throughout the MENA region, a youth bulge followed by a decline in fertility means that 
over time, the ratio of adults to children changes to produce more teachers/nurturers to raise 
fewer children. This facilitates the transition of economic growth away from oil and more toward 
human capital. The timing of this transition is paramount. All the MENA countries with 
declining fertility rates must make a rapid investment in their human capital and create a 
diversified economic base for sustainable growth before the current youth bulge reaches 
retirement (estimated around 2040). At that point there will be a smaller cohort of working 
contributors to care for a larger elderly population. Investment in human capital today, and 
diversification of a sustainable economy away from just an oil based industry, will provide 
tomorrow’s generations with stability and prosperity (Salehi-Esfahani, 2000). 
In sum, in the MENA region, the consequence of women’s increased access to education 
deviates from the common expectations predicting a strong relationship between increased 
access to education and positive changes in women’s social status and eventual social mobility. 
While the MENA region is going through a modernization process, improvements in women’s 
social status still lags due to limited opportunities in the job market and their exclusion in the 
political arena. Women’s social status in the MENA countries has been and continues to be 
conditioned by the economic and political realities and regional stability. When expedient, Islam 
and historical traditions of patriarchy have been engaged as frameworks and justifications for 
controlling the population. However, in Islamic countries where we see a more diversified 
economy, Islam has not been an altogether limiting influence. Therefore, we can predict a 
substantial improvement in the future of women’s status in MENA region if it is able to move 
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away from the reliance on oil exports and focus on an investment in human capital and a 
diversified economy with ample jobs. Most importantly, women’s status would improve by 
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